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Essays
Juvenile Waiver in Rhode Island
Jeffrey B. Pine*
INTRODUCTION
A thirteen year old student at Nathaniel Greene Middle
School allegedly slashes a fellow student in the face with a
razor blade on the way to the school bus.
A seventeen year old male allegedly burns down a home with
six people in it killing all over a dispute with a supposed
occupant.
Two teenaged brothers are sentenced to thirty-three years in
prison for raping, robbing, and trying to murder a city woman
three years before. The younger brother was thirteen at the
time of the crime.'
These events, which all happened within two days of each
other in March 1996, are emblematic of the burgeoning juvenile
crime problem.2 Teenage arrest rates for violent crime now sur-
pass those of young adults.3 Murders committed by youths have
* BA. 1976, Haverford College; J.D. 1979, George Washington University.
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1. Jonathan Saltzman, Salve Regina University Professor on Youth Crime
and Punishment, Prov. J. Bull., Apr. 22, 1996, at C6, available in 1996 WL
9381041.
2. Id
3. James Alan Fox, The Calm Before the Juvenile Crime Storm?, Population
Today, Sept. 1996, at 4. Young adults were defined as between the ages of 18 ard
24. Id.
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increased three hundred percent since 1960, 4 and tripled this dec-
ade.5 Juvenile violent crime is up fifty-seven percent overall. 6
The rise of gun use by youngsters portends an even worse fu-
ture.7 Thirty-five thousand youngsters bring guns to school every
day.8 Juvenile offenders are now younger and more violent 9 This
age group, disproportionately predisposed to criminal activity,10
will continue to grow." Experts warn that we face a more perni-
cious wave of youth violence in the coming decade.' 2
The public is concerned about this trend. Both in Rhode Is-
land and nationally, people fear the increase in violent crime.13
Most people favor tougher measures to deal with juvenile crime14
and believe that bold initiatives are needed to combat the problem.
This essay proposes that waiver is the only appropriate means
for dealing with serious and habitual juvenile offenders. Waiver
generally is the most common means of combating violent juvenile
crime.' 5 Because some juveniles are not amenable to the rehabili-
4. Id. (measuring murders from 1965-1990).
5. States Step Up Punishment of Young Offenders, Prov. J. Bull., May 12,
1996, at A3, available in 1996 WL 10325820 (hereinafter States Step Up Punish-
ment]. From 1990 to 1994, murders committed by 14 to 17 year old juveniles in-
creased 22%. Fox, supra note 3, at 4.
6. Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, The End of the Line: An




9. Linda Borg, Crime Rate's Down, But Maybe Not for Long, Prov. J. Bull.,
Dec. 6, 1995, at C1, available in 1995 WL 13243282.
10. Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile
Justice Law Reform, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 965, 975 (1995). Although accounting for 8%
of the population, males aged 14 to 24 commit 48% of all murders. Fox, supra note
3, at 4.
11. Between now and the year 2005, the teen population will grow 20%. Fox,
supra note 3, at 4.
12. Id.; States Step Up Punishment, supra note 5, at A3.
13. Francis Barry McCarthy, The Serious Offender and Juvenile Court Re-
form: The Case for Prosecutorial Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 38 St.
Louis U. L.J. 629, 629 (1994); Jody McPhillips, Crime, Vilence Top List of Voter's
Concerns, Prov. J. Bull., Oct. 1, 1996, at Al, available in 1996 WL 12467005.
14. McCarthy, supra note 13, at 629 (73% favor treating violent juveniles as
adults).
15. Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, Judicial Waiver Policy and
Practice: Persistence, Seriousness and Race, 14 Law & Ineq. J. 73, 76 (1995) (Every
state has some form of waiver.).
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tative scheme offered in the juvenile system, 16 waiver permits
courts to transfer these juveniles into the adult system.' 7 Part I of
this essay defines the three forms of waiver. Part H reviews the
historical and philosophical underpinnings of the theory for
waiver. Parts IU and IV explore the modern trend of waiver, and
its current use in Rhode Island and nationally. Finally, Part V il-
lustrates the prosecutor's importance in implementing juvenile
waiver.
1. WAIER DEFINFM
Waiver grants adult criminal courts the power to exercise ju-
risdiction over juveniles.' 8 Waiver removes those juveniles who
have proven by the severity and numerosity of their crimes that
they are beyond the rehabilitative efforts of the juvenile system.
Concomitantly, the removal of these dangerous juveniles aids in
the rehabilitation of other youngsters in the system. The rationale
is that these intractable youths stymie efforts to reach less severe
youngsters.
Three types of waiver exist: judicial, legislative and
prosecutorial. Although spawning the same result, each involves
distinctive means.
Judicial waiver allows a judge to transfer a juvenile to adult
criminal court. The waiver may be sought by the prosecutor, the
juvenile or the judge.19 Upon a motion requesting waiver, the
judge holds a hearing at which both sides introduce evidence of the
juvenile's background and prior record.20 The judge weighs the ju-
venile's amenability to treatment and his threat to public safety to
determine if waiver is proper. 21
Legislative waiver automatically removes a juvenile to adult
court jurisdiction.22 This waiver, also known as exclusion,23 is
16. Catherine R. Guttman, Note, Listen to the Children: The Decision to
Transfer Juveniles to Adult Court, 30 Harv. C.IR-C.L. L. Rev. 507, 510 (1995).
17. Id. at 509.
18. Stacey Sabo, Note, Rights of Passage: An Analysis of Waiver of Juvenile
Court Jurisdiction, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 2425, 2426 (1996).
19. Id. at 2437.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 2438-39; Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 15, at 76.
22. Eric Fritsch & Craig Hernmens, Juvenile Waiver in the United States
1979-1995: A Comparison and Analysis of State Waiver Statutes, 46 Juv. & Farn.
Ct. J. 17, 29 (1995).
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designed to ferret out serious and repeat offenders from the juve-
nile system. Age, prior record and seriousness of the present of-
fense are the factors that combine to trigger the automatic
waiver.24
Prosecutorial waiver 2 5 allows the prosecutor to decide whether
to try a juvenile in juvenile court or adult criminal courts. The
prosecutorial waiver statute grants concurrent jurisdiction to the
juvenile court and the criminal court.26 This concurrent jurisdic-
tion allows the prosecutor to file directly with criminal court. The
direct file circumvents any review of the prosecutor's decision. 27
H. HISTORY OF WAIVER
The justice system has always had a mechanism to treat in-
tractable youths as adults. Under ancient Saxon law, a person was
criminally responsible at twelve years old.25 At common law, a
person fourteen years of age or older possessed the requisite culpa-
bility to be criminally liable,2 9 and between the ages of seven and
fourteen, there was a rebuttable presumption that the child was
incapable of committing a crime.30 This presumption could be re-
butted by demonstrating that the child knew the wrongfulness of
his actions,31 but the presumption grew weaker as the child neared
fourteen years of age.3 2 Children under seven years old were
deemed incapable of possessing criminal intent.33
23. See In re Robert, 406 A.2d 266, 268 n.2 (ILI. 1979) (treating Rhode Island's
legislative waiver statute as "exclusion," not waiver).
24. Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 22, at 18; Sabo, supra note 18, at 2443-44.
25. Prosecutorial waiver is also known as direct file, Robert E. Shepherd, Jr.,
The Rush to Waive Children to Adult Court, 10 Crim. Just. 39, 39 (1995), and con-
current jurisdiction, Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 15, at 77.
26. Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 15, at 77; Shepherd, supra note 25, at 40.
27. See Sabo, supra note 18, at 2426; Lisa A. Cintron, Comment, Rehabilitat-
ing the Juvenile Court System: Limiting Juvenile Transfers to Adult Criminal
Court, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1254, 1270 (1996) (noting that the prosecutor's decision is
unreviewable).
28. State v. Berard, 401 A.2d 448, 450 (RI. 1979).
29. Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 22, at 19; Sabo, supra note 18, at 2429.
30. Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 4.11, at 401 (2d
ed. 1986).
31. In re Michael, 423 A.2d 1180, 1181 (R.I. 1981).
32. Id. at 1182.
33. This division of juveniles was entrenched as early as the reign of Edward
fI. Berard, 410 A.2d at 450; see also Guttman, supra note 16, at 511 n.18.
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Rhode Island embraced the common law approach into the
early 1900s.3 4 Under this common law scheme, criminal youth re-
ceived the same sentences and were incarcerated in the same facil-
ities as their adult counterparts.3 5 Capital offenders between the
ages of seven and fourteen faced execution.3 6 Some states began to
segregate children from adult prisoners in 1825,37 and in 1857,38
Rhode Island provided a separate reform school for convicted
youths. Admittance was left to the discretion of the trustees,3 9
however, even those separated children had to serve the full adult
term.4
0
The Progressive Era4" marked the beginning of a wholly sepa-
rate juvenile justice system from 1898 to 1914. Commentators al-
most unanimously recognize the Illinois Juvenile Court Act of
189942 as the first of these efforts to achieve a separate juvenile
justice system.4 3 The first juvenile court quickly followed in
Chicago.44
Rhode Island almost contemporaneously mandated separate
trials for juveniles under sixteen years of age within the existing
court structure.45 Later, district courts were given jurisdiction
over all juvenile wayward and delinquent petitions.46
34. See State v. Mariano, 91 A. 21 (R.I. 1914) (criminal incapacity ceases at
age fourteen).
35. Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 22, at 19.
36. 4 Blackstone, Commentaries *23-24.
37. The founding of the House of Refuge in New York marked the beginning of
this trend. Robert M. Mennel, Thorns and Thistles: Juvenile Delinquency in the
United States, 1825-1940 (1973). By 1899, 65 separate facilities held young offend-
ers. James T. Sprowls, Discretion and Lawlessness: Compliance in the Juvenile
Court (1980).
38. RLI. Rev. Stat. clh. 227 (1857).
39. Id.
40. Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 22, at 19; see also In re Michael, 423 A.2d
1180, 1182 (IL. 1981).
41. The Progressive Era lasted from 1898 to 1914. Thomas A. Bailey, The
American Pageant, A History of the Republic 704 (5th ed. 1975).
42. Juvenile Court Act, Ml. Laws §§ 3, 131, 132 (1899).
43. See Holly Beatty, Comment, Is the Trend to Expand Juvenile Transfer
Statutes Just an Easy Answer to a Complex Problem?, 26 U. Tol. L. Rev. 979, 980-
84 (1995).
44. Deborah L. Mills, United States v. Johnson: Acknowledging the Shift in
the Juvenile Court System from Rehabilitation to Punishment, 45 DePaul L. Rev.
903, 906 n.23 (1996).
45. 1899 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 664.
46. 1915 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 1185.
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Positivism, which blames external circumstances rather than
a person's volition, greatly influenced the Progressive approach to
juvenile justice.47 The doctrine of parens patriae, i.e., that the
state should care for those who cannot care for themselves,4 8 rein-
forced the philosophy to allow state action in this area. Because it
was thought that criminals should be cured, the goal of the system
was to rehabilitate rather than to punish.49 To further rehabilita-
tion, each child was accorded individualized treatment.5 0 This
need to individualize treatment led to the less formal approach ju-
venile courts take.5 '
Technological changes also influenced the Progressive ap-
proach. Industrialization swelled population in urban centers. As
a result, city streets teemed with large numbers of youth. Juvenile
delinquency became a problem as some of these children turned to
crime.52 The Progressives designed the juvenile justice system to
control this increase in juvenile population.5 3 Accordingly, Pro-
gressive reform still required youth discipline and accountability.54
The Progressives also retained a "safety valve" for the worst
juvenile offenders.5 5 Acknowledging that the worst juvenile of-
fenders were beyond the juvenile system's rehabilative efforts, ju-
venile judges possessed the power to transfer select juveniles to the
adult system.5 6 Statutory provisions also closed the juvenile
courts to certain juveniles due to the severity of their offense. For
example, Rhode Island did not allow juveniles accused of murder
or manslaughter access to juvenile courts.57
47. This influence also led to probation and parole of adult offenders. Feld,
supra note 10, at 969 n.5.
48. Allison Boyce, Choosing the Forum: Prosecutorial Discretion and Walker
v. State, 46 Ark. L. Rev. 985, 986 (1994). Civil courts had expanded parens patriae
in the 1800s to take custody of truants and waywards. The Progressives merely
applied this doctrine in a different context. See Guttman, supra note 16, at 511.
49. Boyce, supra note 48, at 986; Mills, supra note 44, at 905-06.
50. Feld, supra note 10, at 970.
51. Sabo, supra note 18, at 2431.
52. Theodore N. Ferdinand, History Overtakes the Juvenile Justice System, 37
Crime & Delinq. 204, 206-07 (1991).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Shepherd, supra note 25, at 39; Beatty, supra note 43, at 997.
56. Eric L. Jensen, The Waiver of Juveniles to Criminal Court: Policy Goals,
Empirical Realities, and Suggestions for Change, 31 Idaho L. Rev. 173, 174 (1994).
57. 1915 RI. Pub. Laws ch. 1185.
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The Progressive philosophy gained widespread support
throughout the first two-thirds of the twentieth century.58 The
Rhode Island legislature formed a separate juvenile court in
1944,59 and this jurisdiction was later shifted to the current family
court.6 0 By 1945, every state had a juvenile court.61 Three thou-
sand juvenile courts and one thousand juvenile correctional facili-
ties were operational in the United States by 1987.62
ITI. Tim MODERN TREND
Two themes emerged in the last half of the twentieth century
which fundamentally altered the juvenile justice system: (1) the
extension of due process guarantees to juveniles, and (2) waning
confidence in the effectiveness of rehabilitation.
The first fundamental reworking of the system was the exten-
sion of due process protections to juveniles. The epochal case in
this transformation is Kent v. United States.63 Kent represents a
rejection of the informal, individualized character of the juvenile
system.6 4 The court recognized that a juvenile had the right to a
hearing before being judicially waived, a formal explanation from
the judge explaining the reasons for the exercise of waiver and ac-
cess to the records which the court used to reach its conclusion.65
The court also addressed factors to consider when deciding the ap-
propriateness of judicial waiver.66 Thirty-seven states have codi-
fied the Kent criteria. 67 Rhode Island courts have held that Kent
mandates the "minimal essentials which must be observed by the
58. Feld, supra note 10, at 997; Shepherd, supra note 25, at 39.
59. 1944 MI. Pub. Laws ch. 1441.
60. 1961 IL. Pub. Laws ch. 73.
61. Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 22, at 20; Sabo, supra note 18, at 2430.
62. Cintron, supra note 27, at 1257 n.23.
63. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
64. See id. at 552-53.
65. Id. at 561-63.
66. Kent lists eight determinative factors: (1) the seriousness of the offense
including whether the offense was violent, (2) whether the offense was committed
against a person or property, (3) the existence of probable cause, (4) the desirabil-
ity of trying the entire case in one forum (when co-defendants are adults), (5) the
juvenile's personal circumstances, (6) the juvenile's prior record, (7) concerns for
public safety and (8) the juvenile's amenability to treatment. Id. at 566-67.
67. Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 22, at 21.
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family court" to comply with Rhode Island's judicial waiver
statute.68
The United States Supreme Court followed Kent with a string
of cases further strengthening juveniles' due process protections.
These cases recognized a juvenile's right to notice of charges,6 9
counsel, 70 cross-examination of witnesses,7 1 protection against
self-incrimination7 2 and double jeopardy,73 and having charges
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.74 Rhode Island has further ex-
tended due process protections by granting juveniles the right to
counsel at pre-trial line-ups. 75
Coinciding with due process extensions was an increasingly
negative perception of the criminal justice system. Crime was on
the rise76 and the system was seen as a failure.77 As a result, a
new approach was needed.
One solution was set forth by the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice in 1967.78 The
commission reported that delinquency was a widespread prob-
68. Knott v. Langlois, 231 A.2d 767, 769 (R.I. 1967). The court in Knott ex-
plained that Kent:
[R]equires, as a precedent to waiver: that the juvenile court afford the
minor an opportunity for a hearing on the "critically important" decision
of whether or not to waive; that in order to permit a child's counsel to
function effectively it allow him access to his clients social service records;
and that the decision of the court include a statement of relevant facts as
well as of the reasons or considerations motivating the determination.
Id. at 769; see also Paquette v. Langlois, 219 A.2d 569, 570 (R.I. 1966).
69. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1966).
70. Id. at 36.
71. Id. at 56.
72. Id. at 55.
73. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975) (The same charges may not be
adjudicated by both juvenile and criminal courts.).
74. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
75. In re Holley, 268 A.2d 723, 728 (R-I. 1970).
76. Crime rose nearly 250% between 1960 and 1980. Fritsch & Hemmens,
supra note 22, at 21.
77. Commentators agree that this shift occurred, but they cannot pinpoint
when. Guttman, supra note 16, at 515 (Disfavor with rehabilitation began in the
1970s.); Jensen, supra note 56, at 175 (Perceptions changed in the late 1960s or
early 1970s.); Sabo, supra note 18, at 2434-35 (Confidence in the system waned in
the 1950s and 1960s.).
78. President Johnson formed the commission in 1965 to formulate solutions
to the growing crime rate. Jensen, supra note 56, at 179.
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lem.7 9 While admitting that the juvenile justice system had failed,
the report concluded that social agencies should divert less serious
offenders from the system and treat them separately.80 Central to
this conclusion was the belief that contact with the system only
worsened juvenile criminalityAe ' This report led to the siphoning
of small time juvenile offenders to these state agencies, while leav-
ing only the "tough cases" behind.8 2
The extension of due process guarantees and diversion pro-
grams resulted in a juvenile system which closely resembled the
one in existence for adult treatment.8 3 Diversion programs meant
the courts had to deal with a disproportionate number of hardened
juvenile offenders less amenable to rehabilitation. s 4 Additionally,
by departing from the less formal approach of its Progressive pro-
genitor, the juvenile system involved fewer cases of individualized
treatment and rehabilitation, and involved more about determina-
tions of guilt or innocence.8 5 Rhode Island courts recognized this
reality and made two allowances: (1) time served at the training
school prior to adjudication qualified as time served toward the
sentence,86 and (2) delinquency adjudication acted as a conviction
to satisfy statutory requisites.8 7 These changes compelled the ju-
venile justice system to perform tasks that it was, and is, ill-
equipped to handle.88
79. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of
Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 55 (1967).
80. Id. at 83.
81. Id. at 80.
82. Jensen, supra note 56, at 180.
83. See Cintron, supra note 27, at 1260.
84. Jensen, supra note 56, at 180.
85. Beatty, supra note 43, at 992. But see Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 281
(1984) (allowing preventative detention for juveniles); McKiever v. Pennsylvania,
403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971); Morris v. D'Amario 416 A.2d 137, 139 (1980); Warwick v.
Robalewski, 385 A.2d 669, 671 (R.I. 1978) (Juveniles do not enjoy the right to
bail.); In re McCloud, 293 A.2d 512, 516 (R.I. 1972) (Juveniles do not have a consti-
tutional right to a jury trial.).
86. State v. DeFonseca, 286 A.2d 592, 594 (I. 1972).
87. In re Bernard, 557 A.2d 864, 869 (R.I. 1989) (holding that a juvenile adju-
dication counts as a conviction for determining whether someone had violated
Rhode Island General Laws section 11-47-5, possession of a handgun by a person
previously convicted of a violent crime).
88. Jensen, supra note 56, at 174; see Sen. Carol Mosley-Braun, Should 13-
Year-Olds Who Commit Crimes with Firearms Be Tried as Adults? Yes: Send a
Message to Young Criminals, 80 A.B.A. J. 46 (1994) ("Our juvenile justice system
was not created to deal with large numbers of youths committing 'adult crimes.").
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Others also opined that the juvenile system was not working,
but recommended a different solution. The "Martinson report"
criticized the effectiveness of the juvenile courts.8 9 The report con-
cluded that "rehabilitative efforts ... have had no appreciable ef-
fect on recidivism."90 Martinson and others concluded that the
juvenile justice system should embrace a punitive and retributive
model.91
In the context of a juvenile system filled with more severe of-
fenders and adult-like procedural safeguards, states partially ac-
cepted the Martinson invitation. However, instead of importing
adult punitive measures into the juvenile court, states increased
the exportation of juveniles into the adult system. Waiver became
the mechanism to achieve this goal. By 1970, every state had some
form of waiver.92 From 1971 to 1987, transfers rose from one to
five percent of juvenile offenders.9 3 Since 1987, use of waiver has
increased twenty-nine percent.9 4
The courts have fortified the ability of states to waive minors.
For example, in Rhode Island, automatic waiver is permissible
with limited judicial review. 95 Other jurisdictions have reached
similar conclusions with respect to prosecutorial waiver, but Rhode
Island has failed to do so.96
89. Robert Martinson was commissioned by the State of New York to study
the criminal justice system. Martinson and his colleagues "reviewed 231 method-
ologically sound studies of rehabilitation programs conducted from 1945 to 1967."
Jensen, supra note 56, at 180.
90. Robert Martinson, What works?-Questions and Answers About Prison
Reform, 35 Pub. Interest 22, 25 (1974).
91. Jensen, supra note 56, at 180.
92. Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 22, at 23.
93. Id.
94. Shepherd, supra note 25, at 40.
95. The Rhode Island Supreme Court has held consistently that the legisla-
ture can dictate which juveniles may be automatically waived. The court reasons
that because family court and its jurisdiction are creations of the legislature, the
legislature may remove jurisdiction conditionally when the assembly can do so ab-
solutely. In re Correia, 243 A.2d 759, 761 (R.I. 1968); see also State v. Mastracchio,
546 A.2d 165, 169 (RlI. 1988) (Juveniles do not have a right to avoid the adult
penal system.); State v. Berard, 401 A.2d 448, 452 (RI. 1979) (Courts will defer to
rational legislative classification of which juveniles should be waived.).
96. See Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334, 335-36 (4th Cir. 1973) ("Such deci-
sions... [aire left for determination by the prosecutor without a hearing and with-
out extension of any of the other due process protections to the person whose
exposure and degree of exposure to prosecution the prosecutor determines.");
United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Prosecutorial discre-
tion does not violate due process or equal protection of the law.).
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IV. WAVER TODAY
In an effort to further expedite the transfer of juveniles, states
are using different types of waiver, lowering the age, and ex-
panding the type and number of prior adjudications and current
offenses which subject a minor to waiver. Since 1979, eighteen
states have broadened their judicial waiver statutes.97 Eight
states added legislative waiver, and three others have expanded
it.98
Judicial waiver is the most commonly used form.99 Forty-
seven states and the District of Columbia have judicial waiver, and
while some states limit the instances when waiver may be exer-
cised, others do not.' o
97. Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 22, at 28.
98. Id. at 31.
99. Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 6, at 450.
100. See Ala. Code § 12-15-34 (1995) (youth 14 and older charged with any fel-
ony or previous commission as a delinquent which would constitute a crime if com-
mitted as an adult); Alaska Stat. § 47.12.100 (Michie 1996) (youth of any age
charged with any offense); Ariz. R. Juv. P. 12, 14 (1996) (youth 16 and older
charged with murder, aggravated assault, sexual assault or a class 1, 2, 3 or 4
felony); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995) (youth 14 and older
charged with capital murder, first or second degree murder, kidnaping, aggravated
robbery, assault, rape, first degree battery or possession of a handgun on school
property, and youth 16 and older charged with any felony offense); Cal. Welf. &
Inst. Code § 707 (West 1984 & Supp. 1996) (youth 16 and older charged with mur-
der, arson, armed robbery, sodomy, kidnaping, assault, crimes against the elderly
or handicapped, drug offense, or sale of ammunition or prohibited firearms); Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 19-2-806 (Supp. 1996) (youth 14 and older charged with any felony);
Conn. Gen. Stat Ann. § 46b-127(b) (West 1995) (youth 14 and older charged with a
class C or D felony or an unclassified felony if previously found a delinquent for a
serious juvenile offense); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1010(b)-(c) (Supp. 1994) (youth
16 and older charged with any offense) (1998 amendment will lower age to 15);
D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2307(a) (1989 & Supp. 1996) (youth of any age charged with
possession of a firearm in school, and youth 15 and older charged with any felony,
and youth 16 and older charged with any offense if previously committed as a de-
linquent); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.052(2)(a)-(b), (3)-(5Xa)-(b) (West Supp. 1996) (youth
any age charged with any offense punishable by death or life imprisonment, and
youth 14 and older charged with arson, sexual battery, robbery, kidnaping, as-
sault, stalking, murder, manslaughter, battery, carrying or using a weapon or
grand theft); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-39 (1994) (youth 13 and older charged with
any offense punishable by death or life imprisonment, and youth 15 and older
charged with any offense); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 571-22(a)-(c) (Michie 1993)
(youth 16 and older charged with any felony); Idaho Code § 20-508 (Supp. 1996)
(youth 14 and older charged with any offense); 705 IMI. Comp. Stat. Ann. 405/5-4
(West Supp. 1996) (youth 13 and older charged with any offense); Ind. Code Ann.
§ 31-6-2-4 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996) (youth 14 and older charged with any of-
fense); Iowa Code Ann. § 232.45 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996) (same); Kan. Stat. Ann.
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§ 38-1636 (1993) (youth 14 and older charged with any Class A or B felony or capi-
tal offense, and youth 16 and older charged with any offense); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 635.020, 640.010 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1996) (youth any age charged with a
capital offense or Class A felony, and youth 14 or older charged with Class B felony
or any felony with a prior felony adjudication or conviction, and youth 16 and older
charged with a Class C or D felony with two prior delinquency adjudications for
felonies); La. Code Juv. Proc. Ann. art. 857 (West 1995) (youth 14 and older
charged with murder, aggravated kidnaping, aggravated sexual assault, aggra-
vated assault, armed robbery, or any offense after adjudication for listed offenses);
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 3101(4) (West 1980 & Supp. 1996) (youth any age
charged with murder, or a Class A, B or C offense); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud.
Proc. § 3-817 (1995) (youth any age charged with any offense punishable by death
or life imprisonment, and youth 15 and older charged with any offense); Mass.
Ann. Laws ch. 119, § 61 (Law. Co-op. 1993) (youth 14 or older charged with any
violent offense or felony offense with prior delinquency commitment); Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 712A.4 (West 1993) (youth 15 and older charged with any felony);
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 260.125 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997) (youth 14 and older charged
with any offense); Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-157 (1993 & Supp. 1996) (youth 13 and
older charged with any offense); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 211.071 (West 1996) (youth 12
and older charged with any felony); Mont. Code Ann. § 41-5-206 (1995) (youth 12
and older charged with homicide or sexual assault, and youth 16 and older charged
with arson, negligent homicide, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, aggravated
kidnaping, sale or manufacture of drugs, or possession of explosives); Nev. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 62.080 (Michie 1996) (youth 14 and older charged with any felony);
N.L Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169-B:24 (1994 & Supp. 1995) (youth any age charged with
any felony); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:4A-26 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996) (youth 14 and
older charged with homicide, robbery, sexual assault, assault, kidnaping, aggra-
vated arson, unlawful possession of a firearm, vehicular homicide while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotics, or distribution of narcotics within 1000
feet of a school); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-3, -20 (Michie 1996) (youth 14 and older
charged with murder, assault, kidnaping, aggravated battery, sexual assault, rob-
bery, aggravated arson, or any felony if three prior felony adjudication's in last two
years, and youth 16 and older charged with any felony); N.Y. Penal Law § 30.00(2)
(McKinney 1987) (youth 13 and older charged with first or second degree murder,
and youth 14 and older charged with first degree kidnaping, first or second degree
arson, first degree manslaughter, first degree rape, sodomy, aggravated sexual
abuse, burglary or robbery); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-608 (1996) (youth 13 and older
charged with any felony); N.D. Cent. Code § 27-20-34 (1991 & Supp. 1995) (youth
14 and older charged with any violent felony, and youth 16 and older charged with
any offense); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.26 (Banks-Baldwin 1993 & Supp. 1996)
(youth 15 and older charged with any felony); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1104.2(A)
(West Supp. 1996) (youth any age charged with any felony); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 419C.349, C.352 (1995 & Supp. 1996) (youth any age charged with murder, first
degree manslaughter, first degree sexual assault, first degree assault or first de-
gree robbery, and youth 15 and older charged with a Class A, B or selected C fel-
ony, and youth 16 and older charged with any offense); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 6355 (West 1982 & Supp. 1996) (youth 14 and older charged with any felony);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-134 (1996) (youth 16 and older charged with murder, man-
slaughter, aggravated sexual assault, aggravated robbery, or aggravated kidnap-
ing); Tex. Far. Code Ann- § 54.02 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996) (youth 14 and older
charged with a capital felony, controlled substance felony or first degree felony,
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In Rhode Island, two categories of youth may be waived by the
judiciary. First, courts may waive anyone sixteen years of age or
older for any felony offense or drug offense with a prior drug-re-
lated conviction.101 Additionally, courts may waive any juvenile
for any offense punishable by life imprisonment.10 2 Both waiver
mechanisms require a hearing to determine if waiver is proper. L03
The judge's findings at this hearing are granted great deference,
bordering on unreviewability.10 4
Thirty-four states and the District of Columbia now employ
legislative waiver. 0 5 Rhode Island's statutory classification for
and youth 15 and older charged with any second or third degree felony); Utah Code
Ann. § 78-3a-603 (1996) (youth 16 and older charged with any murder or any sec-
ond offense felony); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 5506 (1991) (youth from age 10 to 13
charged with murder, manslaughter, aggravated assault, armed robbery, kidnap-
ing, aggravated sexual assault, or aggravated burglary); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-
269.1 (Michie 1996) (youth 14 and older charged with any felony); Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 13.40.110 (West 1993) (youth 15 and older charged with the attempt or
commission of a Class A felony, and youth 17 and older charged with second degree
assault, first degree extortion, second degree sexual assault, second degree rob-
bery, or indecent liberties); W. Va. Code § 49-5-10 (1996) (youth 14 and older
charged with treason, murder, armed robbery, kidnaping, first degree arson, first
degree sexual assault, violent felony if prior violent felony adjudication, or felony
offense with two prior felony adjudications, and youth 16 and older charged with a
violent felony offense, or felony offense with prior felony adjudication); Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 48.18 (West Supp. 1996) (youth 16 and older charged with any offense);
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-237 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1996) (youth any age charged
with any offense).
101. PI. Gen. Laws § 14-1-7.4 (1994).
102. Id. § 14-1-7(a).
103. Id. § 14-1-7.1.
104. A juvenile does not have an automatic right to appeal a decision by the
juvenile court to waive jurisdiction. The only avenue available to a juvenile is to
petition the state supreme court for certiorari. In re Joseph T., 575 A.2d 985, 987
(1990).
105. See Ala. Code § 12-15-34.1(a) (1995 & Supp. 1996) (youth 16 or older
charged with a capital offense, a Class A felony, felony with a deadly weapon, fel-
ony causing death or serious bodily injury, felony with the use of a dangerous in-
strument against certain officials or trafficking drugs); Alaska Stat. § 47.12.100
(Michie 1996) (youth any age charged with an unclassified or Class A felony
against a person); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-127(a) (West 1958) (youth 14 or
older charged with a capital felony or a Class A felony with a Class A adjudication,
or a Class B felony with two prior Class A or B felony adjudications); Del. Code
Ann. tit. 10, § 921(2)(a) (1974 & Supp. 1996) (youth any age charged with first or
second degree murder, sexual assault or kidnaping); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2307(h)
(1989 & Supp. 1996) (youth 16 or older charged with murder, sexual assault, first
degree burglary or armed robbery); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.02(3)(a), (4)(a)-(d) (West
Supp. 1997) (youth any age charged with an offense punishable by death or life
imprisonment, and any other felonies or misdemeanors based on the same offense);
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Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-5(b)(2)(A) (1994) (youth 13 or older charged with murder,
aggravated sexual assault or armed robbery, and youth 15 or older charged with
burglary with three prior burglary adjudications); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571-22(c)-(d)
(1993) (youth 16 or older charged with murder, attempted murder, or a Class A
felony with one prior violent felony adjudication or any two prior adjudications
within two years); Idaho Code § 20-509(1)-(2) (Supp. 1996) (youth 14 or older
charged with murder, attempted murder, sexual assault, robbery, mayhem or ille-
gal possession of drugs/firearms near a school or a school event); ill. Comp. Stat.
Ann. cl 705, 1 405/5-4(3.1)-(3.2), (6)(a), (7)(a), (8)(a) (West 1992 & Supp. 1996)
(youth 15 or older charged with first degree murder, aggravated sexual assault,
armed robbery, possession or sale of drugs at school or a school event, forcible fel-
ony in furtherance of organized gang activity with a prior felony adjudication or
felony in furtherance of organized gang activity with a prior forcible felony adjudi-
cation); Ind. Code Ann. § 31-6-2-1.1(b), (d) (Michie Supp. 1995) (youth 16 or older
charged with murder, sexual assault, kidnaping, armed robbery, car jacking, crim-
inal gang activity, possession of a firearm, drug dealing, or any misdemeanor or
felony with a prior felony or misdemeanor conviction); Iowa Code Ann § 232.8(1)(b)
(West 1994 & Supp. 1996) (youth 14 or older charged with murder or a second
offense concerning alcohol or drugs); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-3611(a), (c), 38-1636(h)
(1995) (youth 16 or older charged with a felony with a prior felony adjudication);
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 635.020(4) (Michie Supp. 1994) (youth 14 or older charged
with a capital offense, a Class A or B felony, or a Class C or D felony with two prior
felony convictions); La. Code Juv. Proc. Ann. art. 305(A) (West 1995) (youth 15 or
older charged with first or second degree murder, manslaughter or aggravated sex-
ual assault, and youth 16 or older charged with armed robbery, aggravated bur-
glary or aggravated kidnaping); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 3101(4) (West 1980 &
Supp. 1996) (youth any age charged with murder, or a Class A, B or C felony); Md.
Code Ann-, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-804(e)(1)-(4) (1995 & Supp. 1997) (youth 14 or
older charged with murder, manslaughter, kidnaping, rape, aggravated assault or
mayhem, and youth 16 or older charged with armed robbery or assault with intent
to murder, rape or rob); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 260.015(5)(b), .125(3)(a) (West Supp.
1997) (youth 14 or older charged with any offense with a prior felony conviction,
and youth 16 or older charged with murder); Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-151(1)(a)-(b),
(2) (1993 & Supp. 1996), § 43-21-157(9) (Supp. 1995) (youth 13 or older charged
with any offense punishable by death or life imprisonment, or any offense commit-
ted with the use of a deadly weapon); Mo. Rev. Code Ann. § 211.071(9) (Smith
Supp. 1996) (youth any age charged with any crime upon petition to court); Mont.
Code Ann. § 41-5-206(3) (1995) (youth 12 or older charged with sexual intercourse
without consent, deliberate homicide or attempted deliberate homicide); Nev. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 62.040(1)(bXl), .080(3) (Michie 1996) (youth any age charged with
murder or attempted murder); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169-B24 (1994 & Supp.
1996) (youth any age charged with a felony); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-3(H) (Michie
1995 & Supp. 1996) (youth 15 or older charged with first degree murder); N.Y.
Penal Law § 30.00(2) (McKinney 1987) (youth 13 or older charged with first or
second degree murder, and youth 14 or older charged with first degree kidnaping,
first or second degree arson, first degree manslaughter, first degree rape, first de-
gree sodomy, aggravated sexual abuse, first or second degree burglary, or first or
second degree robbery); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-608 (1995) (youth 13 or older charged
with a Class A felony); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.011(B)(1), .26(B) (Anderson
Supp. 1995) (youth any age charged with murder or a first or second degree felony
with a prior murder adjudication); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §§ 7001-1.3(2), 7306-
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automatic waiver encompasses juveniles sixteen and older accused
of a felony who have two prior felony adjudications, or accused of a
drug offense if previously adjudicated for a drug offense.' 06
Ten states and the District of Columbia currently employ
prosecutorial waiver; the statutes granting prosecutors this discre-
tion create both age and offense thresholds.'0 7 In two states,
prosecutorial waiver statutes also adduce factors for the prosecutor
to consider when deciding where to file a case.10 s Rhode Island
currently does not have a provision for prosecutorial waiver. Nev-
ertheless, this mechanism is consistent with the goals of the juve-
nile justice system. Waiver allows individualized treatment and
removes the worst offenders whose presence in the juvenile system
has deleterious effects on the system's rehabilitative goal.
V. LET TE PUNismENT Frr THE CRuME
Advocating juvenile waiver initiated by the prosecutor is not a
difficult task when one looks at the state of today's juvenile justice
system. It is apparent that many of the problems with the juvenile
justice system center around the magnitude of the crimes some
1.1(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1997) (youth 16 or older charged with first degree murder);
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Anm. § 6322(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1996), § 6355(e) (1982)
(youth any age charged with murder); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-134(a)(1) (1996)
(youth any age charged with first or second degree murder, rape, aggravated or
especially aggravated robbery, kidnaping or the attempt to commit any of the
listed offenses); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 5505(b) (1991) (youth 14 or older charged
with murder, manslaughter, aggravated assault, armed robbery, kidnaping, aggra-
vated sexual assault or aggravated burglary); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-269.6(c)
(Michie 1996) (youth 14 or older charged with a felony); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 13.04.030(1)(e)(iv), .40.020(14) (West Supp. 1997) (youth 16 or older charged with
a violent felony with one or more prior serious violent felonies, two or more prior
violent felonies or three or more of any combination of any Class A or B felony,
vehicular assault or second degree manslaughter); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 938.18 (West
Supp. 1996) (youth 14 or older charged with kidnaping, vehicular homicide, second
degree reckless homicide, first degree sexual assault, taking hostages, stalking, or
the manufacture, distribution or delivery of a controlled substance).
106. R.I. Gen. Laws § 14-1-7.1 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
107. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(b) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995); Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 19-2-805(1) (Supp. 1996); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2301(3XA) (1989 & Supp. 1996);
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.052(3)(a)(4)(a), (3)(a)(5)(a)-(b)(I) (West Supp. 1997); Ga. Code
Ann. § 15-11-5(b)(1) (1994); La. Code Juv. Proc. Ann. art. 3, § 305(B)(3) (West
1995); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.606 (West Supp. 1996); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-
247 (1993 & Supp. 1996); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 5505(c) (1991); Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§ 14-6-203(c), (e)-(t) (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1996).
108. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-276 (1993); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-6-203(f)(iii), -237(b)
(Michie 1986 & Supp. 1995).
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juveniles commit, and the treatments and sentences they ulti-
mately receive.
A. Current Policy
The policy of this office thus far has been to ask for waiver only
when juveniles commit crimes that are extraordinarily heinous or
premeditated, and/or when the juveniles are habitual offenders. 10 9
Rhode Island's current policy places the decision regarding
whether to waive juveniles into adult court in the hands of the ju-
diciary." 0 The Attorney General's office is involved by filing the
motion for waiver and by making recommendations to the juvenile
court regarding a particular defendant. Allowing the prosecutor to
place certain offenders into the adult system is fundamental in es-
tablishing a system that will equate adult offenses with adult pun-
ishment because it ensures that the punishment is proportional to
the crime.:" The discretion to waive, however, ultimately lies
with the judge.
This office evaluates the crime as well as the individual on a
case-by-case basis, and yet, waiver provisions in Rhode Island do
not grant the prosecutor independent or sole discretion."12 The
109. The following cases are unreported, but press releases supplied by the At-
torney General's office are on file with the Roger Williams University Law Review.
Rhode Island v. Steven Parkhurst (1995) (16 year old youth shot another youth
execution style in the back of the head); Rhode Island v. Ryan Wright (1995) (the
accomplice youth in Parkhurst pled no contest to a second degree murder charge);
Rhode Island v. Kyle Campbell (1995) (17 year old youth stabbed, strangled and
bludgeoned a female during an argument concerning drugs); Rhode Island v. Jose
Tapia (1995) (17 year old youth, in an act of misguided revenge, poured and ignited
gasoline from the third floor of a Providence, three-family home down to the first
floor, thereby igniting the house and killing six members of the Chang family);
Rhode Island v. Jesse L. Robertson (1995) (16 year old youth stabbed two victims
as a result of the theft of a gold chain); Rhode Island v. Eugenio Vazquez (1996) (16
year old youth shot the victim, at point-blank range, in the upper chest during a
dispute concerning a car); Rhode Island v. Joshua Rivera and Rhode Island v. Luis
Rivera (1996) (Two brothers, Joshua, 13 years old, and Luis Rivera, 16 years old,
raped a 33 year old woman in her home at knifepoint, slashed her breast, wrist
and knee, and slashed her throat while counting to eight.). All of these cases ex-
hibit the need for prosecutorial waiver. Prosecutorial waiver would provide the
discretion needed to waive these juveniles directly from the juvenile system into
adult court. This waiver would send the message to youth that the state is serious
about violent crime committed by teens.




case of the Rivera Brothers"3 is an example of this office petition-
ing the court for waiver from the family court system into superior
court based primarily on the crimes committed. In 1993, Joshua
Rivera (thirteen years old at the time) and Luis Rivera (sixteen
years old at the time) brutally raped and stabbed a thirty-three
year old woman in her home in Providence, Rhode Island. Because
of the heinousness of the crime, waiver was appropriate. In the
Rivera case, it is clear the two teens committed offenses which are
adult in nature: sexual assault, and assault and battery using a
deadly weapon. 114 Moreover, experts testified in the case that the
chances of rehabilitation of the defendants was slim and that com-
. munity safety was more important.
However, the type of crime is not the only factor considered
when contemplating waiver. In determining whether a juvenile is
ripe for waiver, the Rhode Island Family Court must consider, on
advisement from the prosecutor: (1) past history of offenses, (2)
past history of treatment and (3) the heinous or premeditated na-
ture of the offense balanced against the interest of society and/or
the protection of the general public.1 15 Therefore, this office exer-
cises substantial deliberation in considering whether to waive a ju-
venile out of family court.116
Some prosecutors may argue that judicial waiver constitutes
an obstacle to effective prosecution of serious juvenile crime. If the
judiciary is not responsive to the prosecutor's approach to waiver,
even youths who commit particularly heinous crimes may remain
in the juvenile system. Judicial waiver also expends valuable re-
sources because of the time involved in filing the waiver petition
113. Saltzman, supra note 1, at C3.
114. Rhode Island v. Joshua Rivera (1996); Rhode Island v. Luis Rivera (1996).
In the early morning hours of February 7, 1993, the respective defendants, two
teenage brothers, broke into the Providence residence of a 33 year old woman and
raped her at knifepoint. The defendants slashed the victim's throat, put the knife
through her neck and counted slowly to eight as they removed the knife. More-
over, they slashed her breast, wrist and knee as she struggled to escape. The vic-
tim continues to suffer emotionally and physically from the attack. Rhode Island
v. Joshua Rivera; Rhode Island v. Luis Rivera.
115. See PlI. Gen. Laws § 14-1-7.1 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
116. In fact, in 1995, 95% of juveniles voluntarily waived themselves out of the
family court system. This statistic is indicative of the commitment to waive habit-
ual offenders in addition to those who have committed crimes of a heinous or pre-
meditated nature. It would be against the interests of the citizens of this state to
allow the offender to remain in the juvenile system in these instances.
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and presenting the evidence for the judge's review. These concerns
may well have justified the introduction of prosecutorial waiver in
some jurisdictions.
In Rhode Island, however, the juvenile system has avoided
many of the concerns that have impelled other jurisdictions toward
prosecutorial waiver. One critical element is the care with which
this office decides whether to seek waiver in a particular case. By
reserving waiver for those cases in which it is truly appropriate,
the prosecutor enhances the credibility of the underlying recom-
mendation. In addition, the Rhode Island Family Court has been
highly responsive to the appropriateness of waiver in cases involv-
ing heinous acts or habitual offenders. Responsible recommenda-
tions by the prosecutor and responsive judicial decisions have
allowed Rhode Island to preserve judicial discretion as a mecha-
nism for assuring public confidence in the waiver process.
B. Changing the Way We View Serious Juvenile Offenders
Some may argue that juvenile waiver provisions in Rhode Is-
land give the prosecutor too much discretion.117 However, it is im-
portant to note that waiver as asserted by this office is a
mechanism used sparingly. Unlike jurisdictions such as Flor-
ida,"" where prosecutors will prosecute juveniles as adults for
crimes that are not "shocking to the senses," Rhode Island imple-
ments juvenile waiver in a much different way. We only remand to
the adult system juveniles whose prospects of rehabilitation are in-
ordinately low because they have spent significant time in the ju-
venile system or have committed crimes of a heinous nature.
The juvenile court has played an increasing role in shaping the
attitudes and beliefs among our citizenry. Social attitudes toward
violent juvenile offenders have taken a turn toward strict enforce-
ment and swift punishment. 119 The historical philosophy of the ju-
venile system to try to rehabilitate serious offenders has given way
117. Sabo, supra note 18, at 2446-51; Shepherd, supra note 25, at 40-41; Cin-
tron, supra note 27, at 1270-71 (advocating a hybrid system without transfer from
juvenile to adult court); Guttman, supra note 16, at 541.
118. Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal
Court: A Case Study and Analysis of Prosecutorial Waiver, 5 Notre Dame J.L. Eth-
ics & Pub. Pol'y 281, 286-88 (1991).
119. Ralph A. Rossum, Holding Juveniles Accountable: Reforming America's
'Juvenile Injustice System," 22 Pepp. L. Rev. 907, 908 (1995); Guttman, supra note
16, at 508.
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to the recognition that violent juvenile offenders need to be pun-
ished. It is the opinion of this office that habitual violent offenders
forfeit participation in the rehabilitative scheme offered by juvenile
proceedings because of the nature and propensity of the acts they
commit.
What it has meant to be a child has significantly changed since
the Progressive Era's vast undertaking of juvenile rehabilitation in
the juvenile system.
[Tihe legal order is not merely a passive reflection of the so-
cial context in which it is embedded, but rather is in addition
a dynamic part of that context. As has been noted, Juvenile
Court would not have been created absent the Progressive
Era's attitudes and beliefs about the nature of young people.
But it is equally true that in its ideological articulation of
purpose and in its practice, the Progressive juvenile court it-
self helped to change our shared social understanding of what
it meant to be a child.' 20
Today, changing social views surrounding the treatment of
some children have ignited the movement to waive children into
adult court.12 1 The juvenile court system fails to achieve reason-
able goals with violent offenders because of the remnants of the
simplistic Progressive philosophy which equated criminally re-
sponsible juveniles with the physical ailments associated with pe-
diatric medicine.122
Indeed, caution and restraint must be employed when assert-
ing juvenile waiver because regression to the time when all chil-
dren were equated with adults is not a desirable goal.' 2 3
Discretionary waiver should be used as a checking device against
violent juveniles who continue to commit crimes that are beyond
the scope of the juvenile rehabilitative system. At no time in our
nation's great history has our citizenry been as threatened by the
threat of violent juveniles. 12 4 In an effort to deal with these offend-
ers, waiver is the most effective mechanism available to our state
prosecutors. It embodies discretion, vigilance and a quest for jus-
tice for the victims of violent juveniles.
120. Allison Boyce, Choosing the Forum: Prosecutorial Discretion and Walker
v. State, 46 Ark. L. Rev. 985, 1133 (1994).
121. Rossum, supra note 119, at 908.
122. Id. at 910.
123. 1915 RPI. Pub. Laws ch. 1185.
124. Fox, supra note 3, at 4.
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CONCLUSION
This Article has retraced the history of the juvenile system as
well as recent juvenile crime trends. Waiver asserted by the Attor-
ney General's office is appropriate for Rhode Island because of the
benefits it presents for both the criminal justice system and vic-
tims. It also improves the quality of the justice system by allowing
opportunity for rehabilitation only for those juveniles whom the
courts decide merit that option.125 In the years to come, if current
trends hold, this country will experience escalating figures in the
category of violent juvenile crime.'2 6 It is prosecutors who should
set the trend for the treatment of these offenders.
From the Progressive Era forward, we have seen that age re-
strictions for the prosecution of violent crimes do not protect soci-
ety and do not aid the reduction of further repeat offenders. 127
Rhode Island's waiver policy is not a broad sweeping mechanism to
cast all juvenile offenders as adults. However, waiver must be
seen as a device to increase the expediency and authority of justice
to victims of violent crime and to those juveniles who have cut
through the safety net of the juvenile system. 128
In conclusion, prosecution of juvenile offenders as adults has
been part of a legal evolution throughout our nation and Rhode
Island's history. As the Rhode Island Attorney General, it is my
duty and responsibility to continue to address national and local
increases in juvenile crime through intervention in the classroom
and aggressive prosecution, where appropriate, in the courtroom.
125. Guttman, supra note 16, at 526.
126. Fox, supra note 3, at 4.
127. Id.
128. Please note the difference between falling through the proverbial safety
net, where in fact the juvenile system is appropriate, and cutting one's way
through it. See the Rivera cases cited supra note 114.
